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background notes

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Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1985

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The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

Official Name: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

PROFILE

People

Nationality: *Noun and adjective*—Soviet(s). **Population** (1984): 273.8 million. **Annual growth rate:** 0.9%. **Density:** 12 per sq. km. (31/sq. mi.). **Ethnic groups** (1979): 52% Russian, 16% Ukrainian, 5% Uzbek, 4% Belorussian. **Religions** (reliable statistics unavailable): Russian Orthodox, Muslim (major); Georgian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Armenian Apostolic, Protestant, Jewish. **Languages:** Russian (lingua franca); more than 100 spoken, 18 by groups of more than 1 million each. **Education:** *Years compulsory*—11. *Attendance*—over 90%. *Literacy*—99.8% (between 9–49 yrs., 1979). **Health:** *Infant mortality rate*—30/1,000 (by Soviet definition); 34/1,000 (by US definition). *Life expectancy* (1982)—62 yrs. (males); 73 yrs. (females). **Work force** (129.1 million, 1983): *Agriculture*—19%. *Industry*—29%. *Transportation and communications*—10%. *Services*—26%. *Government*—2%.

Geography

Area: 22,402,076 sq. km. (8.65 million sq. mi.), about 2½ times the size of the US. **Cities:** *Capital*—Moscow (pop. 8.5 million). *Other cities*—Leningrad (4.8 million), Kiev (2.4 million), Tashkent (2 million). **Terrain:** Varied; low mountains, prairies, tundra. **Climate:** Varied; generally long, cold winters and short summers.

Government

Type: One-party state in which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union controls the state apparatus. Federal Union (est. December 30, 1922).

State Organs: USSR Council of Ministers, USSR Supreme Soviet (750-member Council of the Union, 749-member Council of Nationalities), Supreme Court of the USSR.

Administrative subdivisions: 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 6 krays, 120 oblasts, 8 autonomous oblasts.

Central government budget (1984): 365.7 billion rubles.

Defense (1980): 12%–14% of GNP.

Flag: Red with a yellow hammer and sickle below a yellow star in the upper left corner.

Economy

GNP (1984): $2.04 trillion. **Annual growth rate:** 2.8% (1982–83); 1.9% (1979–83). **Per capita GNP** (1984): $7,400. **Annual avg. growth rate:** 1.9% (1982–83); 1.0% (1979–83).

Natural resources: Fossil fuels, waterpower, timber, manganese, lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, phosphate.

Agriculture (14% of GNP, 1983): *Products*—wheat, rye, oats, potatoes, sugar beets, linseed, sunflower seed, cotton and flax, cattle, pigs, sheep. *Land*—27%.

Industry (37% of GNP, 1983): *Types*—mining, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, fuels and power, building materials, chemicals, machine building.

Trade (1983): *Exports*—$91.7 billion: fossil fuels, raw materials, machinery and equipment, semifinished products. *Imports*—$80.4 billion: machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, raw materials. *Partners*—GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, FRG, Cuba, Finland, Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Romania, Japan, US, India, UK.

Official exchange rate (August 1985): .8145 rubles = US$1.

Membership in International Organizations

UN and several of its specialized and related agencies (IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMCO, ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WMO), Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), Geneva Disarmament Conference, Seabeds Committee, Warsaw Pact, Universal Copyright Convention.

Soviet Union
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
0 400 800 Kilometers
0 400 800 Miles
Names are not necessarily authoritative.
Arctic Ocean
Barents Sea
Kara Sea
Laptev Sea
East Siberian Sea
Chukchi Sea
Bering Sea
Sea of Okhotsk
Sea of Japan
East China Sea
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkhash
Lake Onega
Arctic Circle
Moscow
Leningrad
Kiev
Minsk
Gorki
Kuybyshev
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Tyumen
Omsk
Novosibirsk
Tomsk
Krasnoyarsk
Irkutsk
Chita
Ulan Ude
Yakutsk
Vorkuta
Norilsk
Dikson
Tiksi
Pevek
Anadyr
Magadan
Khabarovsk
Komsomol
Vladivostok
Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy
Murmansk
Archangel'sk
Volgograd
Rostov
Kazan
Perm
Ufa
Orenburg
Saratov
Astrakhan
Tbilisi
Yerevan
Baku
Tashkent
Alma-Ata
Frunze
Dushanbe
Ashkhabad
Samarkand
Bukhara
Chimkent
Karaganda
Semipalatinsk
Barnaul
Novokuznetsk
Kemerovo
Irkutsk
Ulan Ude
Chita
Borzya
Tynda
Aldan
Lensk
Vilyuysk
Urengoy
Tazovskiy
Igarka
Yenisey
Ob
Lena
Angara
Yana
Indigirka
Kolyma
Amur
Volga
Don
Dnieper
Dniester
Danube
Vistula
Oder
Elbe
Rhine
Seine
Loire
Rhone
Po
Tiber
Ebro
Tagus
Guadalquivir
Rhone
Garonne
Thames
Severn
Mersey
Humber
Tyne
Clyde
Forth
Tay
Dee
Spey
Moray Firth
Pentland Firth
Orkney Islands
Shetland Islands
Faeroe Islands
Iceland
Greenland
Norway
Sweden
Finland
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Poland
Germany
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Romania
Bulgaria
Yugoslavia
Albania
Greece
Turkey
Iran
Afghanistan
Pakistan
China
Mongolia
North Korea
South Korea
Japan
Taiwan
Philippines
Indonesia
Malaysia
Thailand
Burma
India
Nepal
Bhutan
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Maldives
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Kuwait
Syria
Lebanon
Israel
Jordan
Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
Spain
Portugal
France
Belgium
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Switzerland
Austria
Italy
Ireland
United Kingdom
Canada
United States
Mexico
Cuba
Jamaica
Haiti
Dominican Republic
Puerto Rico
Trinidad and Tobago
Venezuela
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Brazil
Bolivia
Paraguay
Chile
Argentina
Uruguay
Australia
New Zealand
Papua New Guinea
Fiji
Tonga
Samoa
Hawaii
Alaska
Yukon Territory
Northwest Territories
Hudson Bay
Baffin Island
Ellesmere Island
Victoria Island
Banks Island
Prince of Wales Island
Somerset Island
Melville Island
Devon Island
Axel Heiberg Island
Ellef Ringnes Island
Amund Ringnes Island
Cornwallis Island
Bathurst Island
Lancaster Sound
Barrow Strait
Prince Regent Inlet
Gulf of Boothia
Foxe Basin
Hudson Strait
Ungava Bay
James Bay
Labrador
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia
New Brunswick
Prince Edward Island
Quebec
Ontario
Manitoba
Saskatchewan
Alberta
British Columbia
Great Lakes
Lake Superior
Lake Michigan
Lake Huron
Lake Erie
Lake Ontario
Mississippi River
Missouri River
Ohio River
Tennessee River
Colorado River
Rio Grande
Gulf of Mexico
Caribbean Sea
Pacific Ocean
Atlantic Ocean
Indian Ocean
Arctic Ocean
Bering Strait
Strait of Gibraltar
Strait of Dover
Strait of Hormuz
Strait of Malacca
Suez Canal
Panama Canal
Kiel Canal
Baltic Sea
North Sea
Mediterranean Sea
Red Sea
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Aden
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
South China Sea
Sea of Japan
Yellow Sea
Philippine Sea
Coral Sea
Tasman Sea
Great Australian Bight
Gulf of Carpentaria
Arafura Sea
Timor Sea
Java Sea
Celebes Sea
Sulu Sea
Banda Sea
Flores Sea
Gulf of Thailand
Andaman Sea
Gulf of Oman
Gulf of Aqaba
Gulf of Suez
Gulf of Sidra
Gulf of Gabes
Gulf of Tunis
Gulf of Lions
Gulf of Genoa
Gulf of Venice
Gulf of Taranto
Gulf of Corinth
Gulf of Patras
Gulf of Saronikos
Gulf of Volos
Gulf of Thermaikos
Gulf of Kavala
Gulf of Izmir
Gulf of Antalya
Gulf of Iskenderun
Gulf of Sirte
Gulf of Guinea
Gulf of Mexico
Gulf of California
Gulf of Alaska
Gulf of Anadyr
Gulf of Penzhina
Gulf of Shelikhov
Gulf of Tartary
Gulf of Finland
Gulf of Riga
Gulf of Bothnia
Gulf of Archangel
Gulf of Ob
Gulf of Yenisey
Gulf of Khatanga
Gulf of Olenek
Gulf of Yana
Gulf of Kolyma
Gulf of Anadyr
Gulf of Penzhina
Gulf of Shelikhov
Gulf of Tartary
Gulf of Finland
Gulf of Riga
Gulf of Bothnia
Gulf of Archangel
Gulf of Ob
Gulf of Yenisey
Gulf of Khatanga
Gulf of Olenek
Gulf of Yana
Gulf of Kolyma

GEOGRAPHY

The U.S.S.R. is the largest country in the world. Its territory stretches from the Baltic Sea across the northern Eurasian landmass to the Bering Strait, where an island belonging to the Soviet Union lies only 4.8 kilometers (3 mi.) from one that is part of Alaska. Most of the U.S.S.R. is above 50 north latitude (Winnipeg, Canada lies on that latitude). The latitude of Moscow is the same as that of southern Alaska.

In the west, from the Pripet Marches near the Polish border to the Ural Mountains, Soviet territory stretches over a broad plain broken only by occasional low hills. Crossing this plain to the south are a number of rivers, the most important being the Dnieper, which empties into the Black Sea, and the Volga, which empties into the Caspian Sea. Between the Black and Caspian Seas lie the scenic Caucasian Mountains.

The Urals mark the traditional division between European and Asiatic Russia. To the east are the vast Siberian lowlands and the deserts of central Asia. Beyond are the barren Siberian highlands and the mountain ranges of the Soviet far east. Farther to the east lie the higher mountain ranges, including the Pamirs, Altai, and Tien Shan.

The climate of the Soviet Union, though varied, tends to be long, cold winters and brief summers. In parts of the eastern Siberian tundra, temperatures of −68°C (−90°F) have been recorded, and the January average is about −51°C (−60°F). South of the tundra is a large forest belt covering more than half the country.

South of the forests are the steppes (prairies), where the soil is rich and dark. In this zone are located the "black earth" or *chernozem* soils, some of the best in the world. However, this zone is hampered by its rainless climate and desiccating flows of hot, dry air, the famous Russian *sukhovey*, so that it is not as productive as some areas of the world with less fertile soils. The steppes make up 12% of the U.S.S.R.'s area and contain two-thirds of the arable land.

A small subtropical zone lies south of the steppes along the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. To the southeast, in the deserts of central Asia, rainfall amounts in some places to only 10 centimeters (4 in.) per year.

St. Basil's Cathedral, Red Square.

PEOPLE

The Soviet Union ranks third in world population (after China and India). Moscow and Leningrad are its most populous cities; Kiev, Tashkent, Baku, Kharkov, Gorky, Novosibirsk, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Tbilisi, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Chelyabinsk, Donetsk, Yerevan, and Omsk each have more than 1 million inhabitants.

More than 100 ethnic groups live in the U.S.S.R., but most are very small. Of the total population, 72% are Eastern Slavs. More than 70% of the Slavs (slightly more than one-half the total population) are Russians; the rest are Ukrainians and Belorussians, who live in the southwestern and western sectors of the European part of the U.S.S.R. The remainder of the population includes peoples belonging to Turkic, Finno-Ugric, Caucasian, other Indo-European,

(Courtesy United Nations/P. Teuscher)

An elderly resident of Bukhara, Uzbek Soviet Republic.

and less numerous ethnic groups, including Eskimos. Although each group has its own language, Russian is widely used and is promoted as a second language for all non-Russians.

School programs are governed by ministries of education in the various republics under the control and guidance of the national Ministry of Education, established in July 1966. The programs emphasize science, include the study of at least one foreign language (often English), and are permeated with political indoctrination. A limited number of elective subjects are being introduced in secondary schools on a trial basis for outstanding students. Otherwise, all students are expected to follow the same curriculum.

According to the provisions of a 1984 educational reform, Soviet children are to begin elementary school at age 6, following 1 or 2 (or more) years in state-operated nursery schools and kindergartens. The goal is to increase compulsory schooling to 11 years (from the previous 10) for all children between the ages of 6 and 17.

The Soviet Union also maintains an extensive network of vocational and professional schools, with classes lasting from 6 months to 2 years. These schools supply industry and agriculture with semiskilled and skilled labor. In most cases, students enter vocational schools after 7–8 years of general school; present policy envisions eventually providing all vocational students with a general secondary education as well. In addition, schools and institutions providing semiprofessional and professional training are available. These generally require complete secondary education for admission. Graduates of the 2–5-year program become "middle-grade specialists."

A small proportion of 11-year-school graduates may enroll in an institution of higher learning. Admission is highly competitive and is based on academic records; entrance examination scores; and, to some extent, on social, political, and ethnic background. A higher educational institution may be either a university (a center of general studies normally with a 5-year program) or a more specialized institute (where the course may last 4–6 years). In either case, the curriculum is only slightly less rigid than that of the general secondary schools, and political indoctrination courses are required. The costs of higher education are paid by the state, and students are given small monthly stipends.

Upon completion of a university or institute course of study, most students go to work in areas and jobs specified by national planning authorities. Eventually, a few may return to do postgraduate work in preparation for the advanced degrees of candidate of sciences or doctor of sciences.

HISTORY

Modern Russian history dates from March 1917, when, after pressuring Tsar Nicholas II into abdicating, representatives of the national legislature formed a provisional government. Like the Tsarist regime, the new government continued its participation in World War I, which led to widespread economic and social dislocation and popular discontent. On November 7, 1917, the government was overthrown by a revolutionary group known as the Bolshevik ("Majority") wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, was named head of the first Soviet Government. The new regime concluded the treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany and the other Central Powers on March 3, 1918, ending its participation in World War I. The Soviets declared all land the property of the state, and a rapid succession of decrees nationalized factories, banks, railroads, and other sectors of the economy. A bitter civil war ensued, lasting until 1922.

Lenin's death in 1924 intensified an intraparty struggle between groups led by Josef Stalin, General Secretary of the Party, and, most notably, Leon Trotsky, Grigoriy Zinovyev, and Nikolay Bukharin. Stalin defeated his rivals in the late 1920s and later had them executed or assassinated. Untold numbers of other Soviet political, military, economic, and cultural leaders were imprisoned,



The world-famous Bolshoi Theater, Moscow.

and many died in the purges of the 1930s. Over 11 million people died in an artificially induced famine from 1932–33 as part of Stalin's attempt to gain foreign exchange by selling grain. The Soviet regime also saw in the famine a means of subduing the rebellious Ukrainian peasantry. As many as 12 million others died during the period of the 1930s in labor camps. Party purges reached a climax in the late 1930s, and, virtually the entire Soviet leadership was purged in 1938. The effects on military preparedness were especially severe, since the Red army leadership was also caught up in the arrests. Throughout the 1930s, Stalin also enforced a program of extremely rapid industrialization, particularly in heavy industry.

In the interwar years, Soviet diplomacy was directed toward gaining acceptance by other European countries. It succeeded only partially, however, because the Soviet-led third Communist International (Comintern), founded in March 1919, attempted through local communist organizations to undermine West European governments. Soviet Russia was recognized by many European countries in 1924. The United States recognized the U.S.S.R. in 1933, but relations soon became strained.

World War II

In the spring of 1939, Stalin made overtures to Nazi Germany, and on August 23 of that year, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed. This 2-year nonaggression treaty included secret provisions for the division of Poland, Romania, and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Soviets followed on September 17. The Soviet Government then abrogated its nonaggression pact with Finland and invaded in November 1939. Although there was strong and stubborn Finnish resistance, the Soviets prevailed by virtue of overwhelming numbers. Peace negotiations concluded on March 12, 1940, led to the cession of a large part of eastern Finland to the U.S.S.R. In June 1940, the independent nations of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union. The United States has never recognized the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States. In July, the U.S.S.R. also forcibly annexed two eastern provinces of Romania—Bessarabia, and northern Bukovina.

Hitler turned on his newfound ally and invaded the U.S.S.R. on June 22, 1941. German troops advanced as far as the outskirts of Moscow before being driven back. Four years of fighting and heavy casualties left widespread devastation in the European part of the Soviet Union. Seven and one-half million Soviet soldiers and up to 20 million Soviet civilians perished in the conflict. However, the ultimate victory of the Allies found Soviet forces in a dominant position in Eastern Europe. Protection of this position and enforcing the division of Germany have been fundamental tenets of Soviet foreign policy since 1945.

To engender patriotic support for the war in an appeal to tradition and nationalism, Stalin permitted certain noncommunist elements of Russia's prerevolutionary past, such as the church, to play a larger role in society. Postwar reconstruction, however, brought a return to the oppressive policies of the 1930s.

Postwar Period

Profound differences over the postwar order in Europe led almost immediately to a deep chill in relations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The United States responded with a policy of "containment" vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, which in turn led to the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe, and the development of the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliance systems. The victory of communist forces in China in 1949, the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb in September 1949, and the Soviet-sponsored invasion of South Korea by North Korea in June 1950 led to a further deterioration in East-West relations.

Stalin died on March 3, 1953. As his successors maneuvered for power, they modified some of the more repressive aspects of the regime but did not alter its totalitarian structure. Nikita S. Khrushchev, installed as First Secretary of the Communist Party in September 1953, consolidated his power when he defeated an attempt by G.M. Malenkov,



(Courtesy United Nations/P. Teuscher)

Tourists line up to view Lenin's tomb in Red Square.

The Kremlin, a 12th-century fortress built on the Moscow River, serves as the U.S.S.R.'s political and administrative center.

V.M. Molotov, and others to unseat him as party leader in June 1957.

In a secret speech to the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev denounced Stalin as a despot who had sacrificed much of the party's best talents through misdirected purges and mistaken military tactics. "Destalinization" was accompanied by the introduction of certain reforms into the political system, and under Khrushchev's leadership, the principle of "peaceful coexistence" with the West was given greater emphasis. Party rule remained supreme, but some discussion and controversy within the party was permitted. Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, although the Soviet news agency TASS announced that he had resigned because of poor health and advanced age. Aleksey Kosygin became Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Leonid Brezhnev was made First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee.

Brezhnev's Leadership

Brezhnev emerged from the 24th Party Congress (March–April 1971) as first among equals in a collective leadership. The new leadership's desire to build a more solid, institutional consensus for policy decisions was shown in April 1973, when heads of the army, secret police, and foreign ministry were given full membership in the ruling Politburo. Official actions under this leadership reflected the sharing of power among leaders reluctant to permit significant changes in the internal or external political status quo. Although some attempt was made to repair the damage inflicted on Stalin's image during the Khrushchev era, there was no return to the mass terror of the Stalin period.

In the early 1970s, Soviet relations with Western countries improved, and trade with the West expanded. Several arms control agreements, the cornerstone of which was SALT I (1972), were concluded with the United States. For a brief period in the mid-1970s, it also appeared as if internal controls were easing. Dissidents emerged in large numbers; Brezhnev signed the Helsinki Final Act, which committed the Soviet Union to observe certain human rights standards; and emigration from the Soviet Union increased dramatically. As the decade progressed, however, the regime initiated a gradual internal tightening of controls, which coincided with a more aggressive Soviet arms buildup and foreign policy. Soviet and Soviet-proxy interference in Angola and the Horn of Africa, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the suppression of the labor movement "Solidarity" in Poland, and a brutal crackdown on human rights in the late 1970s and early 1980s led to a renewed chilly period in East-West relations.

Following the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, Yuriy Andropov, former Chairman of the KGB, became General Secretary. Andropov initiated a campaign to eliminate corruption and began to chart a new program of economic reform. Seriously ill for most of his 15-month tenure, he did not live long enough to implement fully his new policies. East-West relations deteriorated further under his brief tenure with the Soviet suspension of the START [strategic arms reduction talks] and INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks, the attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007, and other developments. When Andropov died on February 9, 1984, the Politburo selected Konstantin Chernenko, 72, to succeed him as General Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee. Chernenko also proved

Principal Officials

Communist Party Politburo

Geydar A. Aliyev
Viktor M. Chebrikov
Mikhail S. Gorbachev
Viktor V. Grishin
Andrey A. Gromyko
Dinmukhamed A. Kunayev
Yegor K. Ligachev
Nikolay I. Ryzhkov
Vladimir V. Shcherbitskiy
Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Mikhail S. Solomentsev
Nikolay A. Tikhonov
Vitaliy I. Vorotnikov

Candidate Members

Peter N. Demichev
Vladimir I. Dolgikh
Vasiliy V. Kuznetsov
Boris N. Ponomarev
Sergey L. Sokolov

Communist Party Secretariat

Mikhail S. Gorbachev (General Secretary)
Vladimir I. Dolgikh
Ivan V. Kapitonov
Yegor K. Ligachev
Boris N. Ponomarev
Konstantin V. Rusakov
Nikolay I. Ryzhkov
Mikhail V. Zimyanin
Boris I. Yel'tsin
Lev N. Zaykov

Government Officials

Chairman, Presidium of the Supreme Soviet—Andrey A. Gromyko
Chairman, Council of Ministers—Nikolay I. Ryzhkov
First Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers—Geydar A. Aliyev, Ivan V. Arkhipov
Chairman, State Planning Committee—Nikolay K. Baybakov
Minister of Foreign Affairs—Eduard A. Shevardnadze
Minister of Defense—Sergey L. Sokolov

Ambassador to the United States—Anatoly E. Dobrynin
Ambassador to the United Nations—Oleg A. Troyanovskiy

The Soviet Union maintains an embassy in the United States at 1125 - 16th Street NW., Washington, D.C. 20036 (tel. 202-628-8548). The embassy's consular office is at 1825 Phelps Place NW., Washington, D.C. 20008. A Soviet consulate general is at 2790 Green Street, San Francisco, Calif. 94123 (tel. 415-922-6642).

to be in poor health and died after barely a year in office. To succeed him, the Politburo promptly chose Mikhail Gorbachev, 54, thereby beginning the transfer of power to a new generation.

Present Leadership

Gorbachev's rise in the Soviet power structure was unusually swift: from a regional party leader to the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] General Secretary in only 6 years. After 8 years as head of the Stravropol region party apparatus, Gorbachev moved to Moscow in 1978 to become national party secretary supervising agriculture. A year later, he became a candidate Politburo member and in November 1980, a full member. He succeeded Chernenko as General Secretary on March 11, 1985.

In his first 6 months in office, Gorbachev moved rapidly to put his own people into positions of authority and to consolidate his control over the party and governmental apparatus. His principal rival for political power, Grigoriy Romanov, was ousted from the Politburo at a July 1985 plenum. The same plenum named Eduard Shevardnadze Foreign Minister to replace Andrey Gromyko, who was promoted to the largely ceremonial role of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. On September 17, 1985, Nikolay Ryzhkov was named Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, or Premier.

Gorbachev's leadership style is activist and decisive. He has projected a new sense of purpose and is oriented to making the system work more effectively. He has stressed the need for greater discipline and efficiency in dealing with the Soviet economy, but it remains to be seen whether or not he will make the fundamental changes required to bring about sustained increases in Soviet economic performance. His domestic agenda may become clearer following the adoption of a new party program at the 27th Party Congress in February 1986.

GOVERNMENT

In the Soviet system, ultimate power is exercised by the leaders of the Communist Party. The party imposes its will through a government apparatus patterned after Western political democracies but with little real separation of powers. Government functions are dictated by the party, whose hegemony is explicitly acknowledged by the Constitution. The party makes state policy and supervises its implementation, and party influence and power pervade all phases of life.

One of the major tools at the party's disposal to maintain its hegemony is the KGB, or Committee for State Security. This organization not only conducts intelligence operations abroad but also, through networks of agents and informers, keeps careful check on the political reliability of Soviet citizens at home and abroad. The KGB has modified its role since the death of Stalin, but its presence is still felt by all Soviet citizens.

Since Stalin's death, many of the most infamous forced labor camps have been closed and the number of political prisoners reduced significantly. The camps continue to function, however, and since 1966, increased publicity has been given to political trials and the sentencing of prominent dissident intellectuals and representatives of national minority groups. Psychiatric abuse has partially replaced more traditional means of repression.

The Party

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a membership of more than 18.4 million, or about 6% of the total population. Party membership is the main avenue to positions of real authority in the Soviet system. Bound by rigid discipline, party members are expected to carry out faithfully those policies set by party leaders.

The most powerful policymaking organ of the Communist Party is the Politburo of the party's Central Committee. The Politburo has 13 members and 5 candidate members. The 10-member Secretariat of the party's Central Committee provides day-to-day executive and administrative direction for the entire party machine. Together, the Politburo and Secretariat constitute the real seat of power in the Soviet Union. The General Secretary (head of the Secretariat) traditionally holds the top position in the Soviet Communist Party.

In theory, the Politburo and Secretariat are accountable to the party's Central Committee. In fact, however, the Central Committee is largely a forum for presenting party policy to the most important members. Normally, it gives party policies unanimous approval. It is not in a position to initiate policy, although on rare occasions the Central Committee has been called on to mediate a serious deadlock which has developed within the Politburo.

According to party statutes, the Central Committee should meet twice yearly. It met rarely in Stalin's time but more frequently under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, and now under Gorbachev. The membership includes approximately 305 full members and approximately 139 candidates.

The Party Congress is, theoretically, the highest authority of the party. Party statutes call for a congress to be held every 5 years. The 26th Congress met in February and March 1981; the 27th is expected to convene in February 1986. Like the role of the Central Committee, the real role of the Party Congress is to give approval to policies set by the party leaders and to provide these policies with an aura of legitimacy. The Party Congress is also a forum for listing past achievements and describing future tasks.

Government Apparatus

The party operates through a government apparatus which has little independent authority. The legislative organ is the Supreme Soviet, theoretically the highest state authority in the Soviet Union. It has two equal houses—the Council of the Union, with 750 members elected on the basis of population, and the Council of Nationalities, with 749 members elected on the basis of territorial units. Elections are called for every 5 years. Only one deputy, approved by the party, runs from each constituency.

Between the semiannual sessions of the Supreme Soviet, which last approximately 4 days, formal power is vested in the 41-member Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Its chairman, Andrey A. Gromyko, is chief of state. The Supreme Soviet formally names the Council of Ministers, the highest executive organ and most important part of the government structure. Under party direction, it supervises the work of the ministries and other governmental bodies.

Soviet Republics

Party and government organizations in each of the 15 constituent union republics are patterned after the central party and government organizations and are subject to direction from Moscow. The constituent union republics are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldavia, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The United States does not recognize the forcible incorporation of the latter three into the U.S.S.R., and it maintains diplomatic relations with representatives of the free governments of these three Baltic States.

ECONOMY

The Soviet Union has the world's second largest industrial base. Western observers estimate Soviet gross national product (GNP) for 1984 at about $2.04 trillion and per capita GNP at about $7,400.

Once an underdeveloped peasant society, the U.S.S.R. has made considerable economic progress since the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, largely by forcing the pace of basic industrialization. However, the high priority given heavy industrialization has meant a serious neglect of the consumer sectors of the economy.

The Soviet economy is largely self-sufficient with a broad industrial base. Except in such top priority sectors as defense and space, Soviet technology lags well behind the West. The Soviet economic system historically has been resistant to technological innovation, largely because of the emphasis on large-scale industrial expansion. The system places a premium on high quotas and the quantity of production, generally at the expense of quality. Similarly, in contrast to a competitive market economy with its strong incentive to innovate and develop new technologies, the bureaucratically mired and overcentralized Soviet system tends to stifle innovation.

Despite a relatively low rate of technological progress, the Soviet economy maintained high growth rates until the mid-1970s. Economic growth has been one of the leadership's top priorities and has been maintained largely by high rates of capital investment in industry, coupled with ever-growing numbers of industrial workers. Much of this expanding labor force has come from workers leaving rural and agricultural areas. The share of production and profits devoted to reinvestment has always been high, thus fostering rapid expansion in the number of plants and equipment. Capital investment consistently has risen faster than GNP as a whole; as a percentage of GNP in 1984 it was 34%, compared to 24% in 1960.

Although still reasonably fast by Western standards, Soviet economic growth has decelerated. The average annual rate of GNP increase was about 6% in the 1950s, slipped to about 5% in the 1960s, fell below 4% in the 1970s, and has remained between 2 and 3% in the 1980s. Declining growth rates are partially attributable to declining growth in industry, which in turn has resulted from a drop in the productivity of capital and falling growth rates in labor productivity. Evidence is strong that worker alienation, as evidenced by widespread alcoholism, is a major factor in poor labor productivity.

Shortages of skilled labor are another growing problem for Soviet industry. Increasing shortages in the European U.S.S.R. contrast greatly with the abundant labor pool in the Central Asian region. Not only will natural growth in the labor force drop from about 2 million persons per year in the 1970s to about 400,000 by the mid-1980s, but nearly all of the 400,000 will come from the less-skilled and less-mobile populations of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. This will compound the problem further for industry concentrated in the European U.S.S.R. of imported technology. Efficiency can best be enhanced by the solution of other problems endemic to the Soviet system. These include "storming" (irregular production schedules with a last-minute rush to fill quotas), hoarding of inventories (because of unreliable delivery), pricing of goods that does not properly reflect real costs, inflexible plans and quotas, and political interference in enterprise management and decision-making.

To a considerable degree, the inefficiencies of the Soviet economy are a result of the U.S.S.R.'s highly centralized, bureaucratic planning and administration. The Communist Party leadership makes basic economic decisions that are incorporated into the annual plan and the 5-year plan. Although it has expanded at a faster rate than GNP as a whole, growth in capital investment has been declining since the 1960s. The 1981–85 plans intended for

capital investment to increase no faster than GNP as a whole.

The expansion of Soviet trade with the West over the past decade and a half has stemmed largely from hopes of achieving technological progress through large-scale imports of Western technology. However, increased imports from the West alone cannot bring about the modernization and increased efficiency that the Soviets seek. A long-standing resistance to innovation in the Soviet system impairs the efficient adoption into plans covering virtually every aspect of the economy. Though the much-heralded 5-year plans set general outlines for development, the annual plans are considerably more significant for the actual operation of the economy. Much of the planner's control is executed through the allocation of resources.

Industrial and commercial enterprises are state-owned and -operated. Government control of the economic system is reinforced by financial and accounting controls. The state controls the budget, the banks, and accounting and statistical systems. The largest sources of state revenue are the taxation of enterprise profits and the "turnover tax," a sales tax levied on all transactions of consumer goods and services. Direct income taxes provide less than 10% of the governnment revenue.

While most of Stalin's rule saw an overwhelming orientation toward heavy industry, the years following his death in 1953 saw a significant econonmic reorientation. Khrushchev did not abandon the priority given heavy industry, but he put more emphasis on improving living standards. The Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko regimes continued this trend; agricultural investment, consumer goods, and housing development have all been expanded in an attempt to improve the lives of Soviet citizens.

The results of the tenth 5-year plan (1976–80) were a disappointment to the Soviet leadership. Though supposedly more realistic and moderate than earlier plans, several of the plan's major goals were not reached. Transportation problems and inadequate supplies of raw materials and intermediate goods impeded growth. Shortfalls in the production of key industrial commodities—especially steel, oil, coal, construction materials, and chemicals—were particularly serious. Although production shortfalls are common in the Soviet economy, the 1979–80 problems were unusually severe and reflected the Soviet economy's endemic problems. In addition, bad weather contributed to



Top: The Kremlin's cathedrals, palaces, and museums attract visitors from all over the world to Red Square.

Bottom: A hydrofoil tour on the Moscow River.

poor harvests in 1979 and 1980, leaving the agricultural sector in disarray and dashing consumers' hopes of a significant improvement in diet.

The planned 4% annual growth rate of the current eleventh 5-year plan (1981–85) has proved unattainable. In 1981 and 1982, the GNP increased by 2.1% and 2.6%, respectively. Due to improved weather conditions, increased labor discipline, and additions to production capacity, the growth rate reached 3% in 1983.

The plan places the greatest emphasis on developing heavy industry and agriculture, with the highest growth targeted for military-related branches of industry. Although the directives contain much rhetoric on the need to boost living standards, few gains in consumption are likely in the near future. Whatever anxiety the leadership feels about the Soviet consumer's plight has not been enough to cause a significant reallocation of resources in the consumer's favor.

The guidelines of the present 5-year plan contain nearly 50% less statistical data than previous plans, suggesting delays, uncertainties, and possible conflicts among Soviet decisionmakers.

To meet their ambitious targets, Soviet leaders are calling for stricter discipline and increased efficiency for workers and managers. Science and technology are also to be given an expanded role in boosting the productivity of labor and other resources. Without an acceleration in growth of productivity to offset the slower growth in the skilled labor force, Soviet economic growth will continue to fall.

Resources

Within its vast expanse of territory, the U.S.S.R. has a generous endowment of most natural resources. Energy resources, fuel, and hydroelectric power are estimated to be at least 25% of the world's total, but their extraction and utilization is hampered by difficult terrain and inhospitable weather. Because the most easily accessible energy resources are becoming exhausted, the Soviets are turning increasingly to Siberian minerals and energy deposits, which are difficult and costly to exploit. Although oil and coal production have peaked, natural gas and nuclear energy have significant growth potential in the near future. Soviet timber and manganese resources are the largest in the world. The U.S.S.R. also has ample supplies of lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, and phosphate. It lacks a large domestic reserve of only two major minerals—tin and uranium. Despite the wealth of energy resources, energy conservation is becoming increasingly important due to high energy prices and tightening supplies of oil and coal.

Trade

Total Soviet foreign trade amounted to $172 billion in 1983—$91.7 billion in exports and $80.4 billion in imports. Of this $172 billion, 56% was with other communist countries, mainly with the six East European members of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Soviet Union exports primarily fuels and raw materials. Soviet imports are primarily machinery, industrial equipment, and manufactured consumer goods. The Soviets are pressuring CEMA partners to increase exports to the U.S.S.R. to reduce the Soviet trade surplus with them. Higher oil prices accounted for a large part of the increase in value of Soviet exports to CEMA countries in 1983. Soviet trade with China doubled in 1983 to reach $650 million, the highest level of Sino-Soviet trade since 1960.

In 1983, 14% of Soviet trade was conducted with noncommunist developing countries. Trade with these countries consists typically of exports of Soviet machinery and equipment, often associated with economic aid projects, in return for agricultural raw materials, foodstuffs, and some light manufactured goods. In recent years, half or more of Soviet deliveries to these countries have been military goods.

The remaining 30% of 1983 Soviet trade was with the developed Western countries. This percentage was down from 32.6% in 1981 and largely reflected a 25% cut in purchases from the United States and Japan in 1983. Imports from the United States fell because of a decline in agricultural purchases as the U.S.S.R. enjoyed an improved grain harvest that year. The drop in imports from Japan reflected reduced purchases of steel pipe and machinery. In contrast, Soviet trade with Western Europe continued to rise with machinery imports increasing by 15% as the U.S.S.R. continued to purchase Western technology needed to modernize its economy. The Federal Republic of Germany remains the U.S.S.R.'s leading Western trading partner, with Finland, Italy, and France following closely behind. U.S.S.R. imports from the United States, exceeding $2 billion in 1983, consisted primarily of wheat, corn, and phosphoric acid, which is used primarily for the production of fertilizer. U.S.S.R. exports

Mechanized tea-picking on a collective farm in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic.
(Courtesy United Nations)

to the United States in 1983 totaled $445 million and included gold, platinum, ammonia, and oil.

The Soviet hard-currency trade deficit for 1983 was down to $1.3 billion. Oil exports, which currently account for 60% of Soviet hard-currency exports, increased in volume by 15% in 1983. In addition, better harvests in 1983 helped the Soviets cut back on grain imports.

The Soviets have been able to finance their hard-currency trade deficits through borrowing, gold sales, and earnings from other components of the balance of payments. However, in order to preserve its credit rating, the U.S.S.R. will probably exercise some restraint with respect to nongrain imports. In the short term, the Soviets will be under great pressure to maintain oil production, which will become increasingly difficult and expensive, in order to keep up hard-currency earnings. Any significant drop in oil production would confront the Soviets with the hard options of reducing hard-currency exports to the West, lowering deliveries to Eastern Europe, or squeezing domestic consumption. Over the longer term, the Soviets plan to increase exports of natural gas as a hard-currency earner, which should compensate for the anticipated decline in oil exports.

Agriculture

Despite increased investment and a rise in farming incomes, agriculture remains the Soviet Union's greatest economic problem. Harsh and unpredictable weather has added to the U.S.S.R.'s major shortcoming, namely, the failure to introduce efficient management practices and technologies needed to stimulate and boost production. The U.S.S.R. has about 60 million square kilometers (2.3 million sq. mi.) of arable land and pasture. However, much of this land is poor by Western standards. Sown crops occupy only 10% of the total land area.

Agriculture is organized into about 28,000 collective farms (average area is 64 sq. km. or 25 sq. mi.) and 18,000 state farms (average area is 194 sq. km. or 75 sq. mi.). State farms operate as "agricultural factories" on which farm workers are paid wages. Theoretically, collective farms function like cooperatives, although decisionmaking is more centralized. On state and collective farms, workers and peasants are permitted the use of small, private plots. Although they account for only 3% of the total sown area, these plots produce 33% of the country's meat, milk, eggs, and vegetables, and 66% of its potatoes.

However, in the production of livestock products, the small private sector depends heavily on state and collective feed supplies. When shortfalls have occurred, as in 1972, 1975, 1979, and 1980, the government has shown greater tolerance toward private agriculture.

In 1983, investment in agriculture accounted for 27% of total investment. In particular, investment in fertilizer facilities, storage and refrigeration facilities, and farm machinery increased as part of a plan to increase investment in industries that directly support agriculture. In 1983, gross agricultural output rose by 5%, reaching a new all-time high. The livestock sector performed particularly well as a result of strong emphasis given by the leadership to the building of herds. Meat and milk output reached new records as well.

A recent Soviet agricultural goal has been to increase meat supply to improve the diet and standard of living of the Soviet population. However, their targets have not been reached. In 1983, meat supply increased only slightly to 51.7 kg. per capita. To meet the Soviet goal of 85 kg. per capita in 1990 will require large, stable, domestic grain production in addition to imports, as well as increased use of feed proteins. Given the continued inability of the farm sector to produce sufficient amounts of grain to support the ambitious goals of the meat program, demand for imported grain is likely to remain high.

Economic Future

The overall outlook for the Soviet economy for the remainder of the 1980s is for continued growth, although probably at increasingly modest rates. Labor shortages will place a premium on increased productivity; however, ingrained worker attitudes and probable continued reluctance by the leadership to risk the uncertainties of meaningful economic reform will make productivity breakthroughs unlikely. The export of oil and, increasingly, natural gas should continue to be the chief earner of hard currency for the Soviets, while Soviet manufactures, with the exception of chemicals, are likely to remain noncompetitive in Western markets. If energy sales falter, it would not be surprising to see the Soviets step up borrowing in Western Europe in order to help meet hard-currency needs. Bilateral trade between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to continue to be a modest proportion of both countries' overall foreign trade. If, as it appears, large-scale U.S. grain sales continue, U.S. exports to the Soviet Union should exceed imports from the U.S.S.R. sizably.

Since taking office in the spring of 1985, Gorbachev has made a determined effort to improve output through the imposition of a discipline campaign—including a crackdown on alcoholism—and high-level personnel changes. Economic experiments, such as broader managerial rights, labor brigades, and wages based on final output, which have been underway in several industrial ministries, are to be expanded; investment in the renovation of existing industrial facilities—as opposed to the construction of new ones—is to be stressed; the decisionmaking power of individual enterprises will apparently be broadened; and greater efforts will be made to promote closer cooperation between the Soviet scientific establishment and production facilities. It is not clear, however, how far the leadership is prepared to go with reforms that might mean greater reliance upon the market

Travel Notes

Climate and clothing: The climate of the USSR is as varied as that of the US, although it tends to be cooler. Winter travelers to European areas of the USSR should bring their warmest clothes, boots, and hats. Public buildings, hotels, and homes are well-heated, however. Hot weather generally occurs from June through August; Moscow summer temperatures often get up to the 30sC (90sF), and lightweight clothing is suitable. Spring and early fall are unpredictable; snow flurries and temperatures in the mid-20sC (80sF) are both possible in May and September.

Customs and visas: A valid Soviet entry/exit visa is required of all US travelers to the USSR. Tourists, business people, and persons attending conferences or conventions in the USSR should arrange their travel through one of the many US or European travel agencies accredited by Intourist, the official Soviet travel agency. In addition to arranging all travel and hotel accommodations (which must be paid for in advance), the travel agent makes arrangements for visas.

A customs declaration must be completed on arrival, and baggage and personal effects are often examined closely by customs inspectors. No Soviet currency may be brought into or taken out of the USSR, and all other currency and valuables must be declared. The declaration, stamped by Soviet customs authorities, must be retained by the traveler and presented upon departure. Understating or not declaring currency or valuables—including commonplace items such as wedding rings—can lead to confiscation. Currency exchange may only be carried out by official Soviet Government agencies, and all receipts should be kept by the traveler. All offers to exchange money on the street or to buy personal clothing or other items should be refused; this violates Soviet law.

Soviet customs authorities often confiscate religious objects or publications, particularly if the traveler has more than one or two such items. Sexually oriented material and publications considered "anti-Soviet" may also be confiscated. Soviet authorities are extremely sensitive to attempts to bring in marijuana or narcotic drugs or to take out correspondence or other items for Soviet citizens.

Health: Adequate medical care is available in the larger cities, although some common medications are not. Methods of treatment and facilities often differ from those to which Americans are accustomed. Travelers needing medical care should ask their hotel service bureau or their Intourist guide to direct them to the proper facility. Medical treatment is provided to foreigners without charge under most circumstances. No immunizations beyond those normally kept current in the US are required of travelers to the USSR.

The US Public Health Service has noticed that many US visitors to the USSR, and particularly to Leningrad, have returned to the US infected with the intestinal parasite *giardia lamblia*. The infection is probably contracted by consuming tapwater, or ice or drinks made from tapwater. It might also be transmitted by cold foods, such as salads. Bottled water presumably is free from infection.

Telecommunications: International telephone and telegraph service is theoretically available throughout the USSR, although travelers may encounter difficulty in placing international telephone calls. Direct-dial telephone service between the Soviet Union and many countries was suspended by Soviet authorities in September 1982, and has been only partially reinstituted under restricted conditions. For most of the year, Moscow is eight time zones ahead of Washington, DC.

Transportation: Daily international flights are available from Moscow, Leningrad, and other major Soviet cities to major cities in Europe. Aeroflot landing privileges were suspended by the US Government in September 1983 following the Soviet attack on Korean Air Lines Flight 007.

Internal intercity transport is usually by plane (the Soviet Government airline, Aeroflot) or train. Most trains are comfortable and clean. The major Soviet cities—Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, and others—have subways and bus transportation. Taxis can sometimes be difficult to obtain, and taxi drivers generally do not understand foreign languages.

to set prices and a willingness to shut down inefficient enterprises. Unless major reforms are undertaken, it is difficult to see how the Soviets can overcome the inefficiencies built into their economic system and significantly improve economic performance in the upcoming (1986–1990) twelfth 5-year plan.

DEFENSE

The Soviet Union maintains large and growing military forces. It is estimated that the Soviets spend between 12% and 15% of their GNP on defense, compared to 5% by the United States.

The armed forces of the U.S.S.R. number more than 4.4 million members. Men are legally required to serve, although deferments and exemptions may be granted in special cases. Modern mechanized ground forces are well equipped with tanks. The Soviet Navy is the largest in the world, and the Soviets possess a vast arsenal of strategic missiles.

The Soviet Union dominates the Warsaw Pact, established in 1955. The alliance joins the U.S.S.R. and its East European allies—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. A Soviet officer heads the pact's joint command.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Three broad interrelated areas of Soviet foreign policy concern are the industrialized democracies, the developing nations, and the communist world.

Soviet theoreticians point to the Leninist concept of "peaceful coexistence" as the central feature of Soviet foreign policy. This concept is "a specific form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism in the international arena . . . the basically antagonistic conflict between the two opposing socioeconomic systems is transferred from the level of military clashes to that of economic competition, comparison of political systems and ways of life, and ideological struggle." In practical terms, the U.S.S.R. has sought to avoid direct conflict with the industrialized democracies while promoting communism in developing nations. The U.S.S.R. is the first among equals in the Warsaw Pact, a military alliance among East European communist states (Yugoslavia excepted). The U.S.S.R.

St. Isaac's Cathedral is also a museum.

places a high priority on maintaining communist rule in the "fraternal socialist" states, by military force if necessary, as in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Recent years, however, have seen the rise of the "Solidarity" labor movement in Poland, a movement which was suppressed only after the declaration of martial law under pressure from the U.S.S.R. in 1983.

Afghanistan

The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, installing the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal. Opposition to the Soviets and the Karmal regime has grown and spread throughout the country, and the Afghan resistance fighters (*mujahidin*) have held the Soviet invader to a military standoff. The number of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan has risen to over 115,000, with 30,000–40,000 additional troops serving in support roles across the Soviet border. Soviet tactics against the *mujahidin* and Afghan civilians have been usually brutal, including the use of chemical and toxin weapons and antipersonnel mines disguised as toys. Close to 3 million refugees are estimated to have fled to Pakistan, with another 1.5 million Afghans in Iran, half of whom are refugees. The UN General Assembly has condemned the Soviet invasion in six resolutions, and in 1984, the vote of 119 to 20 with 14 abstentions was the largest ever. The United States fully supports the UN indirect negotiating process on Afghanistan, which is based on four elements:

- The complete withdrawal of all foreign troops;
- The restoration of the independent and nonaligned status of Afghanistan;
- Self-determination for the Afghan people; and
- Return of the refugees with safety and honor.

Eastern Europe

In the years immediately following World War II, the Soviet Union installed communist regimes in East European countries occupied by the Red army. Czechoslovakia fell to the communists after a Soviet-inspired coup d'etat in February 1948. Yugoslavia, liberated from the Nazis by indigenous forces, resisted Moscow's control, maintained its independence, and has been separate from the Soviet bloc since 1948. In addition to its failure to integrate Yugoslavia into the Soviet bloc, the Kremlin has been confronted with a series of upheavals and rebellions against Soviet authority in Eastern Europe including:

- The Berlin uprising of June 17, 1953, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- The 1956 Hungarian revolution, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- Albania's defection from the Warsaw Pact in 1960–61;
- Romania's assertion of foreign policy and national independence from 1962 onward;
- The Czechoslovakian "Prague Spring" uprising of 1968, suppressed by Soviet troops;
- The Polish "workers' revolt" of December 1970—Polish popular disturbances over food price increases in June 1976; and
- Strikes by Polish workers in August 1980, leading to the establishment of the independent "Solidarity" trade and farm unions (suppressed by a December 1980 declaration of martial law).

The record shows that the Soviets have not hesitated to use armed force, when practicable, to contain what they

regard as dangerous manifestations of independence in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union has two principal concerns in the preservation of subservient regimes in Eastern Europe: the security of the approaches to Soviet western borders and the ideological necessity of demonstrating that communism is the wave of the future.

Berlin

After World War II, Berlin was made a separate area under four-power (United States, United Kingdom, France, and U.S.S.R.) control. It is still under this quadripartite responsibility. Soviet claims to have turned over responsibility for their sector to the German Democratic Republic have never been recognized as legal by the other governing powers.

Berlin was a constant focus of East-West crises because of Soviet attempts to isolate the city, located more than 160 kilometers (100 mi.) inside the communist-controlled portion of Germany. By the late 1960s, both sides were ready to attempt to end these confrontations. In mid-1969, the three Western powers, with the Federal Republic of Germany's (F.R.G.) support, approached the Soviet Government with a proposal for negotiations.

Begun in March 1970, the negotiations resulted in September 1971, in the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, which was brought into effect in June 1972. This agreement embodied Soviet commitments to permit unhindered access to Berlin, to provide for improved movement and communications within the city, and to acknowledge F.R.G. ties with West Berlin and the F.R.G.'s right to represent West Berlin abroad.

Although implementation of the Berlin agreement has not been without difficulties and disagreements, it has, to date, resulted in amelioration of the Berlin situation.

CSCE

Progress in East-West relations, particularly the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin and the 1970 treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the F.R.G., opened the way to the convening in 1973 of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The Final Act was signed in Helsinki by the heads of all European countries except Albania, as well as by the United States and Canada, on August 1, 1975. The accord covered principles of state conduct; "confidence-building measures" with respect to military maneuvers; cooperation in the economic, scientific, technical, and environmental areas; and freer human contacts and exchanges of information.

Differences between Soviet and Western compliance with the Final Act, particularly on human rights issues, have become an increasingly important issue in East-West relations and were a focal point of East-West clashes at the 1978 Belgrade CSCE Review Conference and the 1981 Madrid Conference.

Cuba

Cuba has played a special role in U.S.-Soviet relations. The surreptitious installation in 1962 of medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba represented an attempt to gain a quick, major improvement in Moscow's strategic position vis-a-vis the United States. This confrontation was resolved when, at President Kennedy's insistence and under a U.S. threat to blockade the island, the Soviets withdrew all offensive weapons from Cuba and pledged not to reintroduce them.

Later in the decade, Moscow's ties with Cuba grew stronger as the Soviets subsidized the failing Cuban economy and provided substantial amounts of military assistance. Current Soviet support for Cuba is estimated to be more than $10 million per day. Especially since 1975, Cuba's growing military capabilities and certain aspects of Soviet military activities in and around Cuba have been of concern to the United States and the subject of diplomatic exchanges with Moscow. The United States closely monitors all aspects of Soviet-Cuban military cooperation to ensure that U.S. interests are not threatened.

Politically, Cuban activity in other countries is periodically an issue in U.S.-Soviet relations. Cuban activities in Latin America in the 1960s and in Africa in the 1970s have been irritants in U.S. relations with Havana and, to the extent such activities are encouraged or supported by Moscow, with the Soviet Union as well.

The Developing Nations

In the Stalin era, the "two-camp" philosophy of foreign affairs prevailed, in which most of the nonindustrialized nations tended to be lumped with the "imperialist" powers of the West as targets of communist struggle. Stalin's successors soon altered this approach and chose the developing world as an area where the U.S.S.R. could change the global "correlation of forces" to the U.S.S.R.'s favor.

The 20th Party Congress (1956) set the theoretical justification for this policy. Moscow perceived the developing nations as a "zone of peace" and the political leaders there as potential "progressives" deserving Soviet support, especially in encouraging radical, anti-Western sentiment. In the years since that Party Congress, Moscow has usually supported anticolonialist and liberation movements as well as communist parties in the developing world, providing propaganda support, training, and in certain cases, substantial amounts of economic and military assistance. Article 28 of the Soviet Constitution adopted in 1977 commits the U.S.S.R. to "supporting the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress." Soviet aid to developing nations is overwhelmingly military, rather than economic. Cumulative Soviet economic aid dispersed to developing nations from 1954 to 1984 amounted to about $14 billion; military aid totaled $75 billion.

Soviet support for African liberation movements gave Moscow important political influence in southern Africa, following the Portugese revolution of 1974. In Mozambique and Angola, longstanding Soviet support for liberation movements led to enhanced Soviet influence following independence. Soviet and Cuban military aid was vital to the new rulers of those countries in their efforts to consolidate their rule and defeat their opponents. Similarly, the Soviet Union played a crucial role following the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, coming to the aid of the new military government of Lt. Col. Mengistu and later providing assistance in the Ogaden War with Somalia.

Soviet-Asian Affairs

The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). Moscow hailed the advent of the Chinese communists to power in October 1949 as a major accretion of the strength of international communism and moved quickly to cement relations with the new regime in Beijing with the conclusion on February 14, 1950, of a 30-year treaty of alliance and friendship. The Beijing regime was troubled by destalinization and the foreign policies of

Stalin's successors, however, and differences between the two communist giants began to surface in the late 1950s.

In 1960, these differences of both doctrine and national interest became public when the Chinese made a thinly-veiled theoretical attack on Khrushchev's strategy for the international communist movement. There were several desultory efforts to patch up relations but, for all intents and purposes, the breach was final. For the rest of the decade, Moscow and Beijing competed for influence with communist-ruled countries, national communist parties, and throughout the world. After the Chinese exploded a nuclear device in 1964, the Soviets began to view the problem in military, as well as political terms. During the next 20 years, they dramatically increased military forces along the border, and in 1969, relations reached a nadir when the two countries had an armed clash over an island in the Ussuri River. Since then, both sides have periodically engaged in negotiations over the demarcation of the 6,760-kilometer (4,200-mile) border. These talks have not resolved the dispute.

By the 1970s, the Sino-Soviet split had become an accepted part of the geopolitical landscape. Relations between Moscow and Beijing began to reflect Soviet concern about China's steadily improving relations with the highly industrialized nations of Western Europe and Japan, especially after President Nixon's 1972 visit to the P.R.C.

At the end of the 1970s, a combination of the Soviet military buildup in Asia, the invasion of Afghanistan, and support for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, complicated the prospects for a rapprochement. Beijing has said that these three issues pose "obstacles" to the normalization of relations. Over the past few years, however, both Moscow and Beijing have been working to improve their relations. The Soviets and Chinese have held several rounds of political consultations, but have, so far, been unable to make much progress on the three "obstacles." Greater progress has been made in the area of economics and cultural relations, where the two sides have been able to reach some agreements on expanding trade and academic ties. Gorbachev, on his accession to power, said that improved relations with the P.R.C. was high on his foreign affairs agenda. While progress continues to be limited by the serious geopolitical differences which divide them, Moscow and Beijing have agreed to reciprocal visits by their respective foreign ministers.

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.). Vietnam has emerged as one of the Soviet Union's most important client states. Soviet ties to the S.R.V. provide a strategic lever on China's southern flank and have also allowed a dramatic expansion of Soviet naval and air power in the South China Sea through the use of the former U.S. facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. It is largely Soviet economic and military aid to Vietnam which allows Hanoi to maintain the occupation of Cambodia which it launched in 1978. Continued Soviet support for the S.R.V. has damaged relations with the countries making up the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as with the P.R.C. Despite the economic and political costs which this relationship has imposed on

Further Information

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the Soviets, they appear to believe that the geostrategic benefits they derive from their ties with Hanoi are more important.

Japan. Soviet relations with Japan have been strained in the postwar years, in part because of failure to conclude a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty after World War II. The Soviet Union claims that the 1945 Yalta accords give the U.S.S.R. sovereignty over the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai Islands. Japan, however, considers these islands to be the Japanese "Northern Territories." The Soviets have refused to acknowledge that there is any territorial issue to be resolved with Japan. The buildup of Soviet military forces in the region and revelations of KGB defector Stanislav Levchenko of Soviet espionage activities in Japan have further strained the relationship.

The Middle East

The Middle East is a region of major political, economic, and strategic importance to Moscow because it lies close to the U.S.S.R.'s southern border, flanks NATO countries, and has the world's largest proven oil reserves.

The Arab-Israeli conflict provided the opportunity for Soviet entry into the area. Moscow took advantage of this opening in the mid-1950s by inaugurating a military and economic assistance program in Egypt. Exploitation of this regional conflict remained the key element in Moscow's growing presence and influence in the area throughout the three Arab-Israeli wars (1956, 1967, 1973). Heavy-handed Soviet involvement in Egypt's internal affairs led to their expulsion in 1972, but Moscow continued to be the major supplier of arms and economic assistance to the rejectionist Arab belligerents, as well as the other states in the area, and has, when necessary, ignored the anti-communist sentiments of many Arab governments there. Arms supply has been the principal means of Soviet entry into the region, and the Soviets continually probe to exploit new markets.

Today, Syria is the linchpin of Soviet policy in the Middle East, although the Soviets have limited control over Syrian policies. After the defeat of Syria and other Soviet-supported parties by Israel in the 1982 Lebanon war, the Soviets massively resupplied Syria with military equipment that was more advanced than that which had been lost in the fighting. Some of this equipment was being shipped outside the Soviet bloc for the first time. The Soviets are also the principal arms supplier to Iraq.

In the summer of 1984, the Soviet Union put forward a plan calling for an international peace conference on the Middle East. This Soviet initiative represented a modification of a proposal made by Brezhnev several years earlier. It calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, perhaps in confederation with another state. The plan has received *pro forma* endorsement from Arab states but is opposed by Israel and the United States because it is not based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, which is the only internationally agreed basis for peace, and it does not call for direct negotiations between the parties at issue, which would give them a stake in the settlement.

Libyan-Soviet relations remain cooperative, centering on massive Soviet arms sales to the Mu'ammar Qadhafi regime. It is estimated that as of 1983, the U.S.S.R. and its allies have provided $28 billion worth of weaponry to Qadhafi, an inventory far in excess of Libya's legitimate national defense needs and even beyond its capacity to man. Although Soviet sales have not been constrained by the Libyan regime's revolutionary Islamic objectives and use of terrorism, Qadhafi's erratic behavior gives Moscow pause in defining its long-term relationship. A long-promised treaty of friendship and assistance remains unsigned.

International Communism

Moscow's repeated efforts at tightening organizational and ideological unity in the international communist movement have met increasing resistance. When the European Communist Party Conference met in Berlin in 1976, it gave a boost to pluralism within the communist community by acknowledging each party's independence and its right to deviate from the Soviet model by taking national characteristics into consideration. This was in contrast to the world communist meetings convened in 1960 and 1965. Moscow, concerned with the problem of ideological orthodoxy in Eastern Europe, stresses the need for unity in the communist movement, while the Spanish, French, and Italian Communist Parties—the "Eurocommunists"—continue to assert their independence.

Arms Control

Multilateral Agreements and Negotiations. The Soviet Union and the United States have entered into a variety of agreements on arms control. Major multilateral agreements include the following:

- The 1961 Antarctic Treaty, providing for the peaceful use and nonmilitarization of that continent;
- The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, prohibiting nuclear-weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater;
- The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, prohibiting placement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and required peaceful use of celestial bodies;
- The 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and
- The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

The Soviet Union is currently engaged with other nations in a variety of multilateral negotiations.

- The Vienna talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) began in 1973. The goal is to improve stability in central Europe by a reduction in forces and establishment of parity at lower levels in the form of a common ceiling on each side's military manpower in a designated "zone of reductions." The main impasse has centered on two issues: calculation of Eastern force levels, which the United States estimate are significantly higher than the figures tabled by the East; and on the consequent reductions necessary to bring about equality at lower levels of forces.
- The Stockholm talks on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) opened in January 1984, as mandated by the 1983 Madrid CSCE Review Conference. The CDE was directed to negotiate a set of mutually complementary confidence-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. In the CDE forum, measures are being discussed which would promote greater openness and predictability in military activities, in order to reduce tensions, diminish the danger of miscalculation, and limit the likelihood of suprise attack in Europe.
- The U.S.S.R. is a participant in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD), a body which addresses an array of arms control topics, including chemical weapons and nuclear nonproliferation. It was in this body, on

April 18, 1984, that Vice President George Bush presented a U.S. draft treaty to ban chemical weapons.

Bilateral Agreements and Negotiations. The first strategic arms limitation talks (SALT I) resulted in the signing of two agreements on May 26, 1972: a treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems (ABM) and an interim agreement limiting certain strategic offensive arms for a 5-year period. These agreements set the stage for the second round of SALT, which culminated in the signature of the SALT II Treaty in June 1979. The treaty was withdrawn from Senate consideration in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; it has not been resubmitted. The United States pledged in 1982, however, that it would not undercut the provisions of SALT II, provided the U.S.S.R. exercised equal restraint. U.S. policy was affirmed by President Reagan on June 10, 1985, when he called on the Soviets to correct their noncompliance with existing agreements and to join in establishing a regime of truly mutual restraint while negotiations continue.

By 1972, when SALT I was signed, the Soviet Union had equaled the United States in several measures of strategic capability, and had taken the lead in the number of strategic ballistic missiles. The United States did not respond to what appeared to be Soviet efforts to attain strategic equality, believing that such parity could provide the basis for a more stable East-West relationship. The Soviet Union continued its military buildup, however, and today equals or surpasses the United States in most quantitative measures of strategic capability. (For a comprehensive look at Soviet forces, see the Department of Defense publication, *Soviet Military Power.*)

The question of intermediate-range nuclear arms has proved to be an important facet of the arms control issue. In 1977, the Soviet Union began deployment of the SS-20, an advanced, three-warhead intermediate-range missile in addition to considerable quantities of earlier generation INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles. In response to these deployments, the NATO alliance, in December 1979, reached its "two-track" decision: to press for elimination of the Soviet missiles through U.S.-Soviet negotiations, or in the absence of an agreement, proceed with deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles. The United States and the U.S.S.R. initiated talks on INF in 1982,

(White House photo by Dave Valdez)

U.S.-Soviet delegation on arms control. From top left: Ambassador Aleksei A. Obukhov; Ambassador Viktor P. Karpov; Aleksandr Bratchikov, interpreter; and Ambassador Yuli A. Kvitsinskiy. From top right: Ambassador Ronald F. Lehman; Ambassador John Tower; Demitri Arensburger, interpreter; Vice President George Bush; Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; and Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman.

with the United States proposing a complete ban on U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, or failing that, equality at the lowest possible levels. The U.S.S.R. responded negatively, advancing counterproposals unacceptable to the United States and NATO. In the absence of an agreement, U.S. missile deployments proceeded on schedule, with the first in December 1983, whereupon the Soviet Union broke off negotiations.

Moscow and Washington initiated strategic arms reduction talks (START) in June 1982. The United States sought in these negotiations to reach an agreement that would enhance stability and achieve major reductions in the level of strategic weaponry on both sides. The U.S. approach to START reflected the judgment that the approach taken in SALT had failed to ensure real reductions in strategic forces or to redress dangerous asymmetries in forces. Thus, the U.S. START approach proposed a broader set of limitations including direct constraints on the number of ballistic missile warheads (i.e. a one-third cut to a level of 5,000 for each side), along with efforts to reduce the destructive potential of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces. In contrast, the Soviet approach centered on capping existing levels of weaponry. After five rounds of businesslike but inconclusive discussions, the U.S.S.R. refused to set a date for resumption of talks, following the deployment in Europe of U.S. intermediate-range missiles in December 1983.

Current Bilateral Negotiations. The Soviet walkout from arms control talks ended on January 8, 1985, when Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed in Geneva to enter into new negotiations on "the complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and intermediate-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship." Talks began in Geneva on March 12, 1985. Each delegation is divided into three groups to negotiate strategic, intermediate-range, and defense and space arms.

Until the beginning of the third round, the talks made little progress

because the Soviets refused to enter into serious negotiations on offensive reductions. The Soviet delegation insisted that no progress could be made until the United States agreed to a ban on research and development of so-called "space strike arms," in which they included President's Strategic Defense Initiative. The United States rejected such preconditions and repeatedly called on the Soviet Union to begin serious bargaining on deep reductions in offensive weapons. The U.S. delegation stressed that numerous U.S. arms control proposals in both strategic and intermediate-range weapons remained on the negotiating table and that the U.S. delegation had been given unprecedented flexibility to negotiate significant reductions.

On September 30, and October 1, 1985, the Soviet delegation in Geneva presented a formal counterproposal which included concrete suggestions on reducing offensive arms for the first time. Although encouraged that the Soviets had finally put forward specific ideas, the United States was disappointed that the proposal was lopsided in the Soviet's favor. Senior U.S. officials stressed that the United States intended to hear out the full Soviet proposal and closely examine it to see where there might be common ground on which to move forward.

An early product of U.S.-Soviet bilateral cooperation in reducing the risk of war was the "hotline" agreement of 1963, which established a direct communications link between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. This link not only continues in operation today, but agreement was reached on July 17, 1984, in Washington to upgrade the hotline by adding facsimile capability. A series of technical discussions on implementing that agreement have been held in 1985, with the expectation that the system will be fully operational in the near future.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements. Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements has called into question the important security benefits of arms control and undermined the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future. In Presidential reports to the Congress in January 1984 and February 1985, the United States determined that the U.S.S.R. has committed violations and probable violations of arms control agreements including the following: the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva protocol; the 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty; the 1979 SALT II accord; the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty; the 1976 Threshold Test Ban Treaty; and the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.

(White House photo by Pete Souza)

President Reagan with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze during the latter's September 1985 visit to the United States.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Since the Russian Revolution of 1917, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has evolved through several phases, including a period of minimal contact, a wartime alliance, "containment," and an intense cold war rivalry. In recent years, the high hopes of the 1970s for detente have given way to reassessment of this fundamentally adversarial relationship.

The adversarial nature of U.S.-Soviet relations stems from several factors:

- Competing strategic interests;
- The Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet regime, with its messianic, expansionist implications; and
- The absence of political freedoms in the U.S.S.R., which permits the Soviet leadership to conduct foreign policy without the domestic constraints known to democratic states.

There are, however, strong incentives for U.S.-Soviet cooperation, foremost among which is the need to avoid nuclear war. The United States has therefore sought to engage the Soviet Government in constructive dialogue at all levels on the full range of issues which affect both nations. The November 19–20, 1985, meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev is an important part of that effort.

Because of the U.S. military deterrent, the U.S.S.R. has avoided direct aggression against the United States and its allies. Nonetheless, the United States has been concerned by certain Soviet actions in recent years, including:

- A continuing quest for military superiority;
- The occupation of Afghanistan by 115,000 Soviet troops;
- The unrelenting effort to impose an alien Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet clients and allies, particularly Poland;
- Harsh suppression of human rights within the Soviet Union; and
- Violation of certain treaties and agreements and "stretching" the letter of others.

To manage relations with the Soviet Union, the United States has constructed a policy based on three principles: realism, strength, and dialogue. U.S. dealings with the U.S.S.R. must be grounded in a realistic appraisal of the following Soviet strengths and objectives.

- The United States must not overstate the Soviet challenge, but neither can it overlook the potential dangers.
- If the United States intends to counter Soviet objectives, it must have the necessary strength—military, economic, and social—to do so.
- The United States strongly prefers resolution of differences through negotiation, however; and it has conducted a broad dialogue designed to develop peaceful solutions to its problems, and to encourage the U.S.S.R. to live up to its international obligations.

The United States is committed to maintain the military balance against the U.S.S.R. through its own and allied defense programs and, where possible, through mutual and verifiable arms reductions. To counter the Soviet use of force and the threat of force in its foreign policy, the United States has

made clear that it will resist encroachment on its vital interests and those of its allies and friends. In Europe, the allies remain united on the need to counter Soviet missile deployments; deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles have proceeded on schedule. The United States also is continuing its efforts to upgrade NATO's conventional forces. To deter threats to vital interests outside Europe, the United States is developing the ability, with allied support, to move forces rapidly to key areas of potential instability such as Southwest Asia. In the Western Hemisphere, the determination of the United States and its friends to resist destabilization of democratic countries in Central America remains firm. The United States is also working to restrict Soviet expansion by responding positively to the problems of developing nations and by working to strengthen democratic institutions worldwide.

The United States desires an improved relationship with the Soviet superpower. Prime U.S. goals vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. include:

- Respect for the human rights of Soviet citizens;
- Verifiable reductions in nuclear arms;
- Cessation of Soviet interference in the affairs of sovereign states; and
- Improvement in people-to-people, economic and other bilateral relations based on reciprocity and mutual interest.

The United States does not threaten the Soviet Union. The United States does not accept difficult U.S.-Soviet relations as an unchangeable state of affairs and is working to build cooperation, not confrontation, with the U.S.S.R. While the United States is keenly aware that important differences will persist and that the relationship will continue to be adversarial, it also believes that cooperation is possible in a number of areas. The United States continues to hope that the Soviet Government will join in a vigorous effort to achieve concrete results in areas of constructive cooperation.

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Counselor for Administration—David R. Beall
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Science Officer—John C. Zimmerman
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